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Abstract
It is often argued that a mandatory minimum wage is binding only if the
wage density displays a spike at it. In this paper we analyze a model with
wage setting, search frictions, and heterogeneous production technologies,
in which imposition of a minimum wage affects wages even though, after
imposition, the lowest wage in the market exceeds the minimum wage, and
subsequent abolition of the minimum wage does not affect wages. The
model has multiple equilibria as a result of the fact that the reservation
wage of the unemployed and the lowest production technology in use af-
fect each other. Under certain conditions, imposition of a minimum wage
improves social welfare.
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1 Introduction
The effect of a minimum wage on unemployment has been subject of a large num-
ber of empirical studies ‘. Recently, Card and Krueger (1995) have cast doubt on
the perceived wisdom that this effect is positive. Although their results are some-
what controversial, they have been influential as well (see for example Kennan,
1995). To provide a theoretical explanation of a zero (or negative) effect, Card
and Krueger (1995) hint at monopsony models of the labor market. Traditionally,
the presence of monopsony power has been associated with geographically isol-
ated markets, and as such the relevance of monopsony models has been put into
question. However, it is by now well-known that the presence of informational
frictions (or search frictions) on the labor market gives employers monopsony
power as well. ’ Basically, if firms pay wages that are strictly smaller than the
productivity level of the workers then they can still maintain a positive workforce
and earn a profit, because it takes time for the workers to find a better paying
Job .
The imposition of a mandatory minimum wage reduces the degree to which
employers can exploit their monopsony power. As long as the minimum wage does
not exceed the productivity level, it merely redistributes part of the rents of the
match from the firm to the worker, and as such it decreases the difference between
marginal labor productivity and the wage. In a basic equilibrium search model
framework, this shifts the whole wage distribution upward, but unemployment is
not affected (see Van den Berg and Ridder, 1998). In more general frameworks,
unemployment decreases if the upward shift of the wage distribution induces
unemployed workers to accept jobs more frequently (see Burdett and Mortensen,
1998, and Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg, 1999) or increase their search
intensity. In the first case, the imposition of a minimum wage is unambiguously
welfare-increasing.
In this context, a minimum wage can have the additional beneficial effect of
driving out less productive firms. Consider a frictional labor market in which
different firms have different production technologies. In equilibrium, the firms
with a smaller marginal revenue product will offer lower wages than the firms
with a higher marginal revenue product. Nevertheless, the former type of firms
have a positive steady-state labor force and profits level. On the one hand, their
employees will accept any job offer from a high-productivity firm. However, on the
‘See Brown, Gilroy  and Kohen (1982) for a survey of research up to the early eighties and
Card and Krueger (1995) for a recent survey.
2See Boa1 and Ransom (1997) for a recent survey on monopsony.
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other hand, there will always be unemployed workers who prefer a temporary job
at a low-productivity firm over a prolonged spell of unemployment (see Bontemps,
Robin and Van den Berg, 2000). Thus, these low-productivity firms can coexist
with other firms. However, imposition of a sufficiently high minimum wage will
make these low-productivity firms go bankrupt. As a result, after imposition,
workers will only be employed at high-productivity firms, and total social welfare
may increase (see Eckstein and Wolpin, 1990).
All of the minimum wage effects mentioned above are comparative-statics
results derived for equilibrium search models of the labor market (see below for
a more detailed discussion of the literature). In this paper we examine a min-
imum wage effect that has not been detected before. This effect follows from the
existence of multiple equilibria on the labor market, in the context of informa-
tional frictions and dispersion of firms’ production technologies. To understand
the existence of multiple equilibria intuitively, note first of all that the wage offer
by a firm must be in between the reservation wage of the unemployed and the
productivity level of the firm. (If the offer falls short of the reservation wage then
no workers can be attracted.) The idea behind the multiplicity of equilibrium
is then as follows. Basically, a labor market has either (1) high-productivity as
well as low-productivity firms, with unemployed workers using a low reservation
wage, or (2) high-productivity firms only, with unemployed workers using a high
reservation wage. In the second equilibrium, the high reservation wage acts as a
binding lower bound on the set of production technologies that enable a positive
profit per worker. It rules out production at a low productivity level. Now, in
general (i.e., in both equilibria), part of the rent of production is distributed to
the workers in the form of the wage. The resulting wage distribution for the
second equilibrium dominates the wage distribution in the first equilibrium. This
in turn justifies the higher reservation wage in the second equilibrium. Thus,
the reservation wage of the unemployed affects the set of profitable production
technologies, while the set of production technologies in use in turn affects the re-
servation wage value, and this system of highlv nonlinear equations has multipleY
solutions.3
3Acemoglu  ( 1997) derives a result on multiplicity of steady-state equilibria in a matching
model. In that model (contrary to the equilibrium search model in the present study), a firm
is effectively equivalent to a single job, firms endogenously choose their production technology
prior to production, wages follow from decentralized bargaining, workers cannot search on the
job, and labor market tightness depends on the unemployment rate. Multiple equilibria can
occur because the outside option of workers who find a bad job depends on the rate at which
they can find a good job; if the latter is high then this may drive the wage of the bad job up to
an unprofitable level. The precise conditions for multiplicity are very different from ours. For
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Suppose that the labor market is in the first equilibrium, with on average
lower wages and less efficient production than in the second equilibrium. Now
consider the imposition of a minimum wage exceeding the productivity level of
the low-productivity firms. The latter firms will go bankrupt, and the resulting
equilibrium is the second equilibrium, with on average higher wages and more
efficient production. (In a basic model, there is no effect on unemployment at
all.) If the minimum wage is subsequently abolished, the labor market may not
deviate from the (second) equilibrium. In that case, a temporary imposition of
(or increase in) the minimum wage is sufficient to force the labor market
the unfavorable to the favorable equilibrium.
The empirical research on minimum wage effects generally assumes that
minimum wage to be binding, it is necessary that the wage density displays a
from
for a
spike
at the minimum wage. This spike is thought to capture jobs with productivity
at or above the minimum wage as well as below the minimum wage. The latter
jobs may exist temporarily because of job protection legislation or because of the
fact that factor substitution and investment take time. If a spike is absent then,
by analogy to the competitive model, it is argued that workers and wages are
only marginally affected by a change in the minimum wage. The analysis in the
present paper has radically different implications. First, if the imposition of a
minimum wage changes the equilibrium outcome, then the wage density in the
new equilibrium does not necessarily have a spike at the lowest wage. Indeed,
the lowest wage can be strictly larger than the mandatory minimum wage. Our
results are thus consistent with data on repeated cross-sections showing that
the minimum wage level affects the shape of the wage density even though the
latter does not have a spike at the minimum wage level (see e.g. &tros, 1994,
who examines Swedish data). Secondly, if there are multiple equilibria then the
abolishment of the minimum wage may not affect the equilibrium. This could
lead to the erroneous conclusion that the minimum wage was therefore irrelevant.
Note that with multiple equilibria, the notion of “binding” becomes somewhat
unclear.
During the past decade, the theoretical and empirical analysis of equilibrium
search models has become widespread (see surveys by Van den Berg, 1999, and
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). Most of this literature builds on Burdett and
Mortensen (1998)) who develop a model with homogeneous workers and firms in
which workers are allowed to search on the job, and on Mortensen (1990), who
extends this model by introducing heterogeneity. In the homogeneous model,
the possibility of on-the-job search is a sufficient condition for wage dispersion
example, in our main model, equilibrium is always unique if on-the-job search is impossible.
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in equilibrium. In that case, job-to-job transitions are important for maintaining
the workforce of a firm. However, it is generally acknowledged that, to explain
the shape of the wage distribution, it is necessary to allow for heterogeneity in
production levels as well (see Van den Berg and Ridder, 1998, and Bontemps,
Robin and Van den Berg, 2000). The resulting models satisfy a large number of
stylized facts of the labor market, particularly concerning the relations between
job durations, wages, and the sizes of firms (see e.g. Ridder and Van den Berg,
1997).
In this paper, we adopt the benchmark model developed by Mortensen (1990),
in which workers search on the job and production technologies are dispersed
across firms .4 Indeed, for expositional reasons, we will mostly assume that there
are two possible productivity levels. This model is sufficiently rich for our pur-
poses. If both types of firms are active then unemployed and employed workers
receive job offers from both types, and workers at low-productivity firms move
to high-productivity firms whenever they get the opportunity.
The model by Mortensen (1990) with heterogeneous firms and homogeneous
workers has been popular in the empirical analysis of equilibrium search. For
example, Bowlus,  Kiefer and Neumann (1995, 2000))  Bowlus  (1997))  and Bunzel
et al. (1999) estimate this model allowing for a finite number of different firm
types. They argue that in general a rather small number of firm types gives a
reason able fit to the main quantiles of the wage distribution. It should be stressed
that none of this literature has addressed the issue of multiplicity of equilibrium,
or for that sake the possibility that equilibrium may switch in response to policy
changes. Mortensen (1990) derives many properties of the equilibrium solutions.
Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (2000) analyze a model with a continuous
distribution of different production technologies. This model is able to give a
perfect fit to wage data, but due to its complexity it is less amenable to a formal
analysis of conditions for multiplicity of equilibrium.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In
Section 3 we derive the equilibria under the assumption that the job offer arrival
rates for the workers do not depend on the measure of active firms in the economy.
This is a strong assumption. Arrival rates depend on the matching technology in
the labor market, and if the measure of firms decreases then the matching rate
may decrease as well. In Section 4 we therefore extend the model to deal with
this. This extension has not been examined in the above-mentioned literature on
equilibrium search. It turns out that the results are robust with respect to this.
(1990) also allows for heterogeneity of workers’ opportunity costs of employment
(see below).
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In Sections 3 and 4 we also discuss the empirical relevance of multiple equi-
libria, by examining some cases from the empirical literature. In particular, we
show that the estimates in Bunzel et al. (1999) for specific labor markets are such
that these markets display multiple equilibria. In Subsection 3.4 we show that
the results derived for the model with two productivity levels can be extended
to models with more general productivity distributions. Section 5 deals with the
effects of changes in the minimum wage. In Section 6 we examine an alternative
model in which unemployed workers are heterogeneous with respect to the level
of their unemployment benefits. This model generates multiple equilibria as well,
for essentially the same reason as in the basic model. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model framework
Because the model framework is discussed in Mortensen (1990) as well as in
subsequent empirical studies, the present exposition can be brief. The model
considers a labor market consisting of a continuum of workers and firms. The
measure of workers is denoted by nz, and the measure of unemployed workers by
U.  In Mortensen (1990),  the measure of firms is normalized to one. Here, we must
be more explicit on this. In a given steady-state equilibrium, there can be active
(profitable) firms as well as non-active latent firms that may be active in another
equilibrium. We assume that the total measure of firms (active or potentially
active) is fixed, for example because it is determined by capital endowments, and
we denote this measure by n. Later on we will see that if all unemployed workers
accept any nonnegative wage offer then the measure of active firms is also equal
to n.
The supply side of the model is equivalent to a standard partial job search
model with on-the-job search (see Mortensen, 1986). Workers obtain wage of-
fers, which are random drawings from the wage offer distribution F(w),  at an
exogenous rate A, when unemployed and A, when employed. Whenever an of-
fer arrives, the decision has to be made whether to accept it or to reject it and
search further for a better offer. Firms post wage offers and they do not bargain
over the wage. Layoffs accrue at the constant exogenous rate S.  The opportun-
ity cost of employment is denoted by b and is assumed to be constant across
individuals and to be inclusive of unemployment benefits and search costs. We
take 0 < X,,  X,,S < oo and 6 > 0 . 5- The optimal acceptance strategy for the
5For expositional reasons we restrict attention to the limiting case in which the workers’
discount rate is infinitesimally small. The results are robust with respect to this.
5
unemployed is then characterized by a reservation wage 4 satisfying
qb =  b + (A, -
1 - F(w)
‘I) Lw S+ x,(1 - F(w)) dw
It is not difficult to show that this equation does give a unique solution for 4
given the other variables and functions!
Employed workers accept any wage offer that exceeds their current wage. In
sum, workers climb the job ladder to obtain higher wages, but this effort may be
frustrated by a temporary spell of frictional unemployment.
Now consider the flows of workers. First, note that active firms do not offer
a wage below #,  so that all wage offers will be acceptable for the unemployed.
Consequently, the flow from unemployment to employment is X,U.  The flow from
employment to unemployment is S(m - u). In a steady state these flows are equal
and the resulting rate u/m of unemployed workers equals S/(6 + X0).
Let the distribution of wages paid to a cross-section of employees have distri-
bution function G. These wages are on average higher than the wages offered,
because of the flow of employees to better paying jobs. The stock of employees
with a wage less or equal to w has measure G(w) (m - 2~).  The flow into this
stock consists of unemployed who accept a wage less than or equal to w, and this
flow is equal to X$(W)U  The flow out of this stock consists of those who become
unemployed, SG(  w) (m - u) and those who receive a job offer that exceeds w,
X,(1  - F(w))G(w)(m - u). In the steady state, the flows into and out of the
stock are equal, so
G(w) =
6 + A,(1 - F(w)) (2)
where we have substituted for u.
From the two wage distributions we derive the steady-state supply of labor
Z(wl F) to an employer setting a wage w, where we explicitly indicate its depend-
ence on the wages offered by other firms. Somewhat loosely, one may say that
this must equal the number of workers earning 20  in a steady state, divided by the
number of firms paying w in the steady state. Note that it is assumed that a firm
pays the same wage to all of its employees. Let 72,  denote the measure of active
firms (this is not a fundamental model determinant but rather an equilibrium
outcome) .7 As a result,
6The  derivative of the left-hand side with respect to 4 equals one. If & 2 Xl then the
derivative of the r.h.s. w.r.t. 4 is negative or zero. If X0  < X1 then the derivative of the r.h.s.
w.r.t. 4 is positive and uniformly smaller than one.
7As mention ed in the introduction, X0  and X1 may depend on na.  We deal with this in
Section 4.
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l(wIF)  = m - u w  + x,)
na (6 + x,(1  - F(w)))2
m&)(6 + A,> 1-
n,(S  + A,> (6  + X,(1  - F(w)))~
(3)
See Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (2000) for a formal analysis. The equa-
tion above only holds if F does not have mass points, which is shown below.
Further, in this equation, w has of course to exceed 4 (we do not consider a
mandatory minimum wage until Section 5). It is easily seen that L increases in w
on the support of F.
Now consider a firm with a flow p of marginal revenue product generated
by employing one worker. For convenience, we assume that p does not depend
on the number of employees, i.e. we assume that the production function is
linear in employment. We refer to this firm as a firm of type p and to p as the
(labor) productivity of this firm. Each firm sets a wage w so as to maximize its
steady-state profit flow (p  - w)Z(wl  F) g iven F and given the behavior of workers.
We distinguish between two types of firms in this labor market. Firms of
type p,  (pi)  have a production technology that gives them a low (high) labor
productivity p, (pl>,  with p, > p,. It should be stressed that this productivity
level is a firm characteristic and not a worker characteristic. One may think of a
market in which individuals with a certain level of education are employable in
two different occupations. A fraction q of the total measure of firms (active or
potentially active) consists of type-p, firms, and the remaining fraction 1 - q con-
sists of type-p, firms. We take q (and therefore the measures both types of firms
qn and (1 - q)n) to be fixed. For example, these may have been determined by
capital endowments. Indeed, Acemoglu and Shimer (1997) show that productiv-
ity dispersion can be explained as an equilibrium outcome by letting ex ante
homogeneous firms choose their capital before production starts. Alternatively,
productivity dispersion may be the result of differences in product market power.
We take p, > b and 0 < q < 1. If p,  < b then there would be no production, as
all workers would be better off by being unemployed.
Mortensen (1990) derives a number of properties of any equilibrium. First of
all, a wage offer w that attracts workers is profit maximizing only if no mass of
other employers offer w. Consequently, the equilibrium wage offer distribution F
has no mass point. This is a fundamental property of equilibrium search models
with on-the-job search. It follows from the fact that a mass point at say w*
induces any firm paying w* to offer a wage slightly higher than w*,  because then
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its steady-state labor force will be substantially larger at the cost of only a second
order decrease in the profit per worker. This property implies that all workers
face a non-degenerate wage offer distribution, and job-to-job transitions do occur.
Moreover, any equilibrium is asymmetric in pure (firms’) strategies (or symmetric
in mixed (firms’) strategies). That is, equivalent firms offer different wages, yet
they receive the same profit flow. Note that the function l(wlF) increases in
20, so there is a positive relation between the size of the firm and the wage it
offers. A large (small) wage implies that the exit rate of workers at the firm is
relatively small (large), and that a relatively large (small) fraction of all workers
currently employed in the economy is willing to work at the firm. Hence, in terms
of total profits of a firm, there is a trade-off between the profit per worker and
the steady-state number of workers at the firm.8
A second property is that profit-maximizing wages for type-p, employers are
larger than profit-maximizing wages for type-p, employers, if both types are act-
ive, and that there is no gap between the corresponding parts of the support of F.
Indeed, firms with a higher labor productivity offer higher wages, have a larger ’
labor force and have larger profit flows than firms with lower labor productivity.
A third property is that the lowest wage in the market w equals the reservation
wage 4 of the unemployed. If the lowest wage would exceed the reservation wage
then the firm offering that lowest wage would increase its profit per worker by
lowering the offer, without any loss in its steady state labor force. Note that a
firm always offer a wage that is smaller than its productivity level, since they can
always attain a positive profit by offering the reservation wage of the unemployed.
3 Equilibria
In this section we show that the model of Section 2 can have multiple equilibria.
In one equilibrium, all active firms are type-p, firms, whereas in the other, both
types are active. We are concerned with non-cooperative steady-state equilibria.
Somewhat loosely, such equilibria can be thought to consist of a reservation wage
@ and a wage offer distribution F such that (i>  C$  satisfies (1) given F, and (ii>
F follows from the firms’ maximizations of their own steady-state profit flows.
81n  this respect, there is a strong similarity to “turnover costs” efficiency wage models; see
e.g. Stiglitz (1985) and Weiss (1991). The model setup also shares features with Reinganum
(1979), who studies equilibrium search in consumer product markets, and with Montgomery
(1991), who studies a one-shot model of equilibrium search with productivity dispersion on
the labor market. See Ridder and Van den Berg (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1997) and
Montgomery (1991) for overviews of the empirical evidence supporting these types of models.
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3.1 Only high-productivity firms
We start by assuming that only type-p, firm types are active in equilibrium. This
must be verified, by checking whether in equilibrium 4 2 p,. If the latter does not
hold then there is an incentive for type-p, firms to enter the market. We derive
the equilibrium solution as follows: first derive the wage offer distribution for a
given unknown 4 < p,;  then calculate the actual reservation wage by substituting
the wage offer distribution into equation (1). Finally, check whether the resulting
qb exceeds p,.
If only type-p, firms are active then we have a model with homogeneous firms.
The equilibrium in such a model has been solved many times in the literature
(see e.g. Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). Note that here the measuren, of active
firms equals qn. For a given 4 < p,,  the steady-state profit flow of a firm offering
4 equals (p,  - $)1(@‘).  Using equation (3),  this in turn equals
In equilibrium, all other firms have the same profit flow. Thus, all profit-maximizing
wages w satisfy the equality of Cp,-w)Z(wlF)  to the expression above, with I(wlF)
as in (3). This can be solved for F,
F has support ($,iC),  with
! (4)
m- (-$g2#+  (l-  (&)‘)Pl
Obviously, this lies between 4 and p,.  Furthermore,
and
l(wlF)  =
m6X, Pl  - 4
q~(~+~,)(~+x,)  p,  - -
(5)
(6)
(7)
By substituting (4) into (l), it follows that
This satisfies @ _> p, if and only if
(&I - x,)x,(Pl -PA L (6 + Q2(P, - b)
(8)
(9)
In sum,
Proposition 1 There is an equilibrium in which only type-p, firms  are active if
and only if (A,  - WuPl - P2)  > v + Q2(P2  - b)*
A number of comments are in order. First of all, note that the condition
(9) does not depend on Q or on n, or n or m. Secondly, the condition can be
made more transparent by examining special cases. For example, the equilibrium
above does not exist if both p, > b and X,  > X,.  This makes sense: if search in-
employment is more efficient than search in unemployment then an unemployed
worker accepts a job with a wage equal to b, so then type-p, firms can make a
positive profit. Other special cases are discussed in Subsection 3.3. There we also
discuss the empirical plausibility of the condition.
3.2 High-productivity firms as well as low-productivity
firms
Now suppose that firms of both types are active in equilibrium. This must again
be verified, by checking whether in equilibrium 4 < p,. If the latter does not
hold then type-p2 firms will disappear from the market.
The expressions for the equilibrium in such a model follow from the equilib-
rium properties listed in Section 2. Note that here the measure n, of active firms
equals n. The support of F consists of two adjacent parts, say (#,  G) and (C&z).
For a given 4 < p,, the steady-state profit flow of a type-p, firm offering 4 equals
(P2 - 49wlF)* u sing equation (3))  this in turn equals
(P2  - 4
mSX,
n (6 + x,)(6  + 4)
In equilibrium, all other type-p, firms have the same profit flow. Thus, all profit-
maximizing wages 20  of type-p, firms satisfy the equality of (p2  -  z@(w) F) to
1 0
the expression above, with l(wlF) as in (3). This can be solved for F(w) on
w E (~7~>,
where 6 follows from the restriction that F(G)  = 1 - q. As a result,
This lies between 6 and p,.  Note that if q = 0 and p2 = p, then the expression
above equals w in (5), as it should.
Now let us turn to type-pi firms. For a given @,  and for given behavior of
type-p, firms, the steady-state profit flow of a type-pi firm offering G equals
(P 1- C)Z(GlJ’).  Using equation (3),  this equals
In equilibrium, all other type-p, firms have the same profit flow. Thus, all profit-
maximizing wages ‘w  of type-p, firms satisfy the equality of (pl -  w)l(~iF)  to
the expression above, with l(wlF) as in (3). This can be solved for F(w)  on
w E (i&q,
where w follows from F(E) = 1, with F as above,
which can be rewritten using the equation for 6,
( )
s,4\  q
2
w = p, - (PI -Pa) - (P2 - 4) (&)
2
1 1
(13)
Equations (lo)-(  13) constitute F given 4.  It is important to realize that, here
as well as in the previous subsection, the shape of F reflects the bargaining power
of workers vis-a-vis employers. A lower degree of search frictions for employed
job seekers (i.e. a high X,/S) provides an incentive for firms to pay higher wages.
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If search frictions are lower, then a firm paying a higher wage would be able to
increase its labor force substantially (see Ridder and Van den Berg, 1997).
By substituting (lo)-( 13) into (1), and after tedious calculations, it follows
that
4 - (6 + U2b + (x0 - W,(CP~  + (1 - c)p2)
(s + u2 + 0, - x,)x,
(14)
with c defined as
C =
(6+  x,)q 2
( i6 + 49
Note that 0 < c < 1 and that the denominator of 4 is positive. The expression for
4 is similar to the expression (8) for the homogeneous model. The only difference
is that the productivity level in the homogeneous model is replaced by a weighted
average of the productivities in the present model. The weights c and 1 - c reflect
the relative importance of p, and p, for the unemployed individual.g  In general,
c does not equal q. This is because firms take firm heterogeneity into account
when they set wages, and because workers can move from low-productivity firms
to high-productivity firms. If q = 0 (q = 1) then c = 0 (c = 1) and 4 equals the
reservation wage in the homogeneous model with p = p, (p = pl).  The weight
c increases in q and X, /6. This makes sense, as a high value of q means that
high-productivity jobs are abundant, while a high value of X,/6  means that it is
relatively easy to move quickly to a job with a high productivity.
It now remains to check whether 4 < p,. This can be shown to hold if and
only if
(&I - W,C(P,  - P2)  < (6 + U2(P2  - b) (15)
In sum,
Proposition 2 There is an equilibrium in which both types of firms are active if
and only if (X, - &)x,4Pl  - P2)  < (6  + U2(P2  - w
gThis  can be seen from the expression for the mean wage E&U)  earned by employed workers
for a given lowest wage g < p2,
Since workers do not discount the future, EG(w) is the expected steady-state income flow in
employment for a currently unemployed worker.
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By combining Propositions 1 and 2 we obtain
Proposition 3 There exist exactly two equilibria if and only if
&I - x,)x,  > P2 - b > (x,  - x,)x,
(6 + u2 - P, -P, ( 6  +  AJ2  c
(16)
Note that X,,  X, and S only affect these inequalities by way of the ratios X,/s  and
X,/S. Also note that the middle term only depends on monetary flow variables
whereas the left-hand and right-hand sides only depend on time rates (though
the right-hand side also depends on the fraction 4 of high-productivity firms).
This implies for example that if X, > X,  then there are always values of b,  p,,  p2
such that there are multiple equilibria.
Figure 1 displays the admissible equilibrium combinations of 4 and the lowest
productivity among active firms in the market. If p,  is the lowest p among active
firms then all values of 4 in between p,  and p, are feasible, whereas if p,  is the
lowest p among profitable firms then all values of $ below p,  are feasible. In
general, it cannot be ruled out that both line segments contain an equilibrium
point, or that neither contains such a point.
If (16) is satisfied then the unique values of the structural determinants sup-
port two different equilibria, and the model does not predict which one will be
realized and which one will not. As explained in the introduction, this is an im-
plication of the interaction between the reservation wage of the unemployed and
the distribution of technologies that admit profitable production. The reservation
wage 4 affects the distribution of p among active firms by way of the restriction
that these p should exceed 4.  Thus, 4 affects the lower bound of the support of
the distribution of p among active firms. Conversely, the distribution of p among
active firms affects the reservation wage, because part of the rent of production
is distributed to the workers in the form of the wage. This effect works by way of
the expected wage in employment. Due to the nonlinearity of the relation between
w and p,  the reservation wage 4 does not depend on the expectation of p, but
rather on the expectation of a monotone transformation of p among active firms.
If the distribution of p shifts to the right then the wage (offer) distribution shifts
to the right, and if workers search more easily while unemployed than while em-
ployed (i.e., X,  > X,)  then this implies a higher reservation wage: it makes sense
to be more selective while unemployed.
In the next subsection we go into more detail concerning the cases in which
multiple equilibria may occur, and their respective empirical relevance.
1 3
3.3 Discussion
First of all, it is useful to distinguish between whether X, is smaller than, equal
to, or larger than Xi. If they are equal, then search while unemployed is as ef-
fective as search while employed, and consequently the reservation wage of the
unemployed is equal to the instantaneous utility flow while being unemployed,
which is the value of leisure b. This means that there is no feedback from the
productivity (or wage) distribution to the reservation wage, and the equilibrium
is unique. From the propositions above, only type-p, firms are active iff p,  < b,-
while both types are active iff p, > b, which is intuitively obvious. Thus,
If x o = X,  then there exists a unique equilibrium.
If b 2 p2  then only type-p, fkms are active. If b < p,  then both types are active.
Now consider the case X, > X,.  Then workers search more easily while unem-
ployed than while employed, so it makes sense to be more selective while unem-
ployed than if X, were equal to Xi. Consequently, the reservation wage exceeds
b. Moreover, as argued in the previous subsection, higher wages are associated
with a higher reservation wage. By elaborating on (16) we obtain
If X,  > A,  then there always exists an equilibrium.
If b 2 p,  then the equilibrium is unique (only type-p, firms are active). If b < p,
then we have either one of the following three situations: equilibrium is unique
and only type-p, firms are active, equilibrium is unique and both types are active,
or both equilibria are possible. All three cases are attainable for suitable parameter
values.
The empirical evidence in the literature suggests that in general X,  > Xi.
For example, Ridder and Van den Berg (1998) estimate these parameters for a
number of OECD countries, and they find that, typically, X,  is about two to five
times as large as Xi (see also Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg, 2000, for a
discussion of empirical results in the literature). Indeed, for plausible parameter
values, there are generally multiple equilibria. For example, a frictional unem-
ployment rate of 6.25% corresponds to X,/6  = 15. If in addition X, = 3X,  then
the left-hand side of (16) equals about 1.4. It is not unreasonable to expect the
middle term of (16) to be smaller than that. For example, if b be close to the un-
employment benefits level, and the worker can choose between two occupations,
one which has a productivity level which is 100 monetary units per month larger
than b and the other 200, then the middle term equals one. As a result, we have
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multiple equilibria, except for values of c close to one. In terms of q, we have
multiple equilibria for all values of q smaller than about 0.5. So, in this example,
if the productivity distribution is skewed to the right (there are more firms with
low-productivity jobs than with high-productivity jobs) then there are multiple
equilibria.
&ample 1.  To be more specific, take A, = 0.15, X,  =  0.05, S = 0.01, b  =
1000,  P, = llOO,p,  = 1200,q = 0.25 (to fix thoughts, these may be in Dutch
guilders and months). Then in one equilibrium 4 = 1084, w = 1180, and both
types of firms are active, whereas in the other 4 = 1116, w = 1198, and only
type-p, firms are active. In both cases u/m = 0.0625.
Example 2. Bunzel et al. (1999) estimate equilibrium search models for a number
of different Danish labor markets, assuming that p has a discrete distribution.
The different markets are defined by the properties of the workers in it. Each
market is assumed to have its own firms. One of the labor markets contains the
workers with a bachelor degree who are aged between 22 and 30. This includes
about 2.570  of the Danish population aged between 16 and 75. For this market,
the estimation procedure produces two different mass points for p (there is no
evidence for a third mass point). The structural parameters are estimated to
be A, = 0.034, A, = 0.009, S = 0.013, b = -42.8,~~  = 217,~~  = 1239, q = 0.129
(monetary flows are in 1981 Danish Kroner per hours; time rates are in weeks).
Bunzel et al. (1999) report the corresponding estimates of 4 and w to be 54 and
325, respectively. The structural parameters also support another equilibrium,
with # = 364 and W  = 933. In both cases, U/UZ = 0.28. Note that the data
identify the first-mentioned equilibrium.
In their empirical analysis, Bunzel et al. (1999) ignore mandatory minimum
wages. There are actually two types of minimum wages in Denmark (see Jensen,
Rosholm and Smith, 1994). lo The values of the highest of these for salaried
workers are generally close to the observed lowest wages in the labor markets in
Bunzel et al. (1999). If the lowest wage is equal to a minimum wage then the
reservation wage 4 is unidentified; we only know that it is smaller than or equal
to the observed lowest wage. In that case, the reported estimates of # and b could
be upward biased, and there might actually be less scope for multiple equilibria.
loEach  broadly-defined sector (like the metal sector) has a minimum wage that is determined
in central wage negotiations between trade unions and employer organizations. In addition,
each firm has minimum wages that are determined in negotiations between the firms and local
branches of the relevant unions.
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Recall however that the reported estimate of b is already very low (-42.8, whereas
observed wages are dispersed in the interval [54,325]  and the observed mean wage
offer equals 114). From Pedersen and Smith (1998) it follows that the minimum
income support level (social assistance/welfare, including discretionary benefits
and housing benefits) in Denmark in the early 1980s generally exceeds 15. It
therefore seems unlikely that 4 and b are substantially smaller than estimated.
In fact, they could be under-estimated in case of spurious dispersion of observed
wages due to measurement errors.
For most other markets, Bunzel et al. (1999) find evidence of more than two
mass points. We turn to this in Subsection 3.4.
It is instructive to consider the case X, < Xi as well, even though this seems to
be empirically less relevant, and even though, as we will see shortly, there are
no multiple equilibria. In this case, workers search less easily while unemployed
than while employed. Consequently, the reservation wage is smaller than b.  The
higher the wages, the more important it is to leave unemployment as quickly as
possible, so the lower the reservation wage. By elaborating on (16) we obtain
If X, < X, then equilibrium is unique or nonexistent.
If b < p, then the equilibrium is unique (both types of firms are active). If b > p2
then we have either one of the following three situations: equilibrium is unique
and only type-p1  firms are active, equilibrium is unique and both types are active,
or equilibrium is nonexistent. All three cases are attainable for suitable parameter
values.
From the intuition behind the multiplicity of equilibria in the case X,  > X,,  it
is obvious that multiplicity is not to be expected in this reverse case. Necessary
conditions for nonexistence are that X, < X, and b > p,. As will be discussed-
below, the latter is unlikely to occur in an economy in which a minimum wage is
imposed that exceeds the unemployment benefits level.
It may be interesting to examine a few limiting cases. For p, sufficiently
close to p,, the equilibrium is unique (with both types of firms active). In the
limit, of course, the equilibrium solution is equal to the unique solution for the
homogeneous model (which is the equilibrium if only type-p, firms are active).
Now consider the limiting case X, = 0, i.e. the employed do not receive
alternative job offers. It is then optimal for wage-setting firms to offer a wage
equal to the reservation wage of the unemployed. Offering a higher wage would
not increase their workforce. The resulting equilibrium is then the same as in the
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model in which one firm is monopolist in the labor market: all firms offer a wage
equal to the value of leisure b (the “monopolistic solution”; see Diamond, 1971).
Thus, we have the equilibrium in which only type-p, firms are active if b > p2,-
and the other equilibrium if b < p2. In any case, equilibrium exists and is unique.
Finally, consider what happens if search frictions vanish. If X, approaches
00,  i.e. if the unemployed find jobs instantaneously, then they can afford to
be extremely selective with respect to wage offers. As a result, 4 approaches
pi,  so only type-p, firms are active and the equilibrium is unique. In the limit,
the equilibrium wage offer and wage distributions are degenerate in p,. If X,
approaches infinity, i.e. if the employed find jobs instantaneously, then workers
instantaneously move to the top of the wage ladder, and the wage distribution G
approaches the degenerate distribution at p,. In this case 4 does not approach pl,
and neither does F.  However, this is irrelevant, because an unemployed worker,
upon leaving unemployment, immediately moves to a wage p,. As a result, firm
profits tend to zero. It follows from (16) that this equilibrium, which can be
labeled the “competitive solution”, is unique, and is such that both types of
firms are active, although the type-p2  firms lose their employees instantaneously.
Let us return to the situation in which two equilibria are possible. The equi-
librium with only type-pi firms is to be preferred, since employed workers are
on average more productive in this equilibrium, whereas unemployment is the
same in both equilibria.” An unemployed worker contributes b to social welfare,
whereas an employed worker together with his employer contributes the rent of
the match, which equals the productivity level. Alternatively, they contribute
the productivity level minus b (the first case can occur if the non-monetary value
of leisure is zero and unemployment benefits are financed externally). For expos-
itional convenience we adopt the first case; however, the results are robust with
respect to this. In the equilibrium with only type-p, firms, the social welfare flow
S* then equals
Sm
6 + x, b +
Xom
s + A, Pl
In the other equilibrium, the social welfare flow S** equals
**
s -
bm- -
6 + x,
b+ [W>P2  + (1 - W))Pll
where G denotes the cross-sectional wage distribution among workers. Clearly,
s** < s*.
llThe assumption that production is linear in the number of employees important here;
decreasing returns to scale would mitigate the effect.
1 7
Using equation (2))  G(6 can be expressed in terms of F(6),  which equals)
1  -  q.  As a result, S** equals
Jr*s - Sm b+ hm-
s + A, 6+x, 1
so s** increases in Xi and in q. This makes sense. If X, is large then workers
move quickly from type-p, jobs to type-p, jobs. In the words of Acemoglu and
Shimer (1997),  equilibrium is more efficient because workers can achieve a more
efficient allocation by sampling more firms. If q is large then there are not many
type-p, jobs in the first place.
3.4 More than two firm types
Conceptually, it is straightforward to generalize the above analysis to a finite
number of firm types that is larger than two. For any possible lowest productiv-
ity level among active firms, it has to be checked whether the corresponding
reservation wage is both below that level and above the highest productivity level
among the non-active firms. However, if we increase the numbers of firm types,
the parameter inequality that characterizes whether an equilibrium exists with all
possible firm types becomes extremely cumbersome. In Appendix 1 we present,
without proof, the full characterization of the equilibria in the model with three
possible firm types. In that model, the three productivity values are taken to
satisfy 0 5 p, < p, < p, < 00  and p, > b. We denote the fraction of type-p, firms
among the total measure of firms (active or non-active) by qi, with 0 < qi < 1
and  q1 + 42 + 43 = 1. In this model, there are three possible equilibria, corres-
ponding to whether 4 < p,,  or p, < 4 < p,,  or p, < 4. In the second case, a
-
-
fraction q1 /(ql + q2)  ( a rat ion q2/(ql + q2)) of active firms has productivity p,f t
(has productivity p2).
Example 3. For a number of different labor markets in Denmark, Bunzel et al.
(1999) (see Example 2) estimate the distribution of p to have three mass points.
This includes the market for women aged below 22 with less than high school,
the market for women aged above 50 with high school, the market for individuals
aged between 31 and 50 with a bachelor degree, and the market for individuals
aged between 22 and 50 with a master degree and higher. Using the results in
Appendix 1 it can be shown that in all these labor markets, there exist exactly
two possible equilibria. There is an equilibrium in which all three firm types are
active (which is the equilibrium that is identified by the data), and there is an
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equilibrium in which only type-p, firms are active. The reservation wage in case
of only type-p, firms and type-p, firms is below p,,  so there is no equilibrium
with only type-p, firms and type-p, firms.
Example 4.  Bowlus  (1997) estimates equilibrium search models for a number of
different US. labor markets, assuming that p has a discrete distribution. The
setup is similar to Bunzel et al. (1999). 0 ne of the labor markets concerns
full-time jobs for male college graduates who were aged between 14 and 22 in
1979 and who are followed until 1991. The number of firm types is estim-
ated to equal 3. The other reported structural parameter estimates are A, =
0.031, x, = 0.0064,S = O.O023,p,  = 607,~~ = 804,~~ = 1053, q2 = 0.28,q,  = 0.08
(in U.S. Dollars and weeks).12  In addition, $, E&W),  and w are estimated to
be 152, 564, and 807, respectively. From equations (1) and (2) it follows that
(s + ~,>~  = (6 + X,)b  + (Al - w&4, and this can be used to obtain the
estimate that b = -998. The equilibrium with 3 firm types is unique. However,
it is clear that the estimated value of b  is implausibly low. This is may be a
consequence of measurement errors in the wage data. If the true lowest wage in
the market is higher than the observed lowest wage, and if this is ignored, then
4 and b are under-estimated.13 Suppose that the true value of b is 60 Dollars
per week (instead of -998; it then follows that in the equilibrium with all three
firm types the reservation wage of the unemployed young male college graduates
is 431 Dollars per week instead of 152). Then there are two possible equilibria:
one in which all three firm types are active, and one in which only type-pi and
type-p2 firms are active.
The labor markets in Examples 2-4 may display additional equilibria, in which
currently latent firms are active. Those firms have productivity levels that are
below the current reservation wage or mandatory minimum wage. It cannot
be inferred empirically whether additional equilibria exist or what productivity
levels those firms have, simply because we do not observe any activity at currently
latent firms.
Now suppose that the distribution of p is continuously distributed across firms.
12The model estimated by Bowlus  (1997) also allows for transition rates into and from non-
participation. For our purposes, we may proceed by simply adding the value of the transition
rate to non-participation 71 to the value of 6. The former is so small for this market that this
does not affect the first four digits of the value of 6.
130f course in that case the other estimates may be biased as well. Notably, if the model
tries to fit an’empirical wa;e data distribution that has a fatter left-hand tail than it should
have, then Ar may be under-estimated.
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We denote the distribution function of p across all active and non-active firms by
I,(p).  This is a structural determinant. For convenience we assume that I0 has
a positive and continuously differentiable density y0 on the support (b, p), with
0 5 b < p < 00.  We assume that I?,(b)  < 1, which is a necessary condition to-
have production.
Let p denote the infimum productivity of firms which make a profit and thus
are active on the market. This is of course not a structural determinant. The
measure of active firms rt, equals (1 - I’&&  Let I’(p) denote the distribution
of p among active firms,
r(p)  - rOb)  - rO(P)-
1 - r,(p)--
with p 2 p.
Bontemps,  Robin, and Van den Berg (2000) provide a comprehensive theor-
etical and empirical analysis of the model with a general continuous distribution
for p, They show that p = max{pJ}, that w = 4,  and that 4 < 35,  under
the assumption that p haS  a finite mean, i.e. b,(p) < 00.  Somewhat loosely,
one may state that, in case of a continuous productivity distribution, only one
wage is profit maximizing for a firm of a given type p. This defines the mapping
w = K(p).  In equilibrium, K  is increasing and non-linear in p and dependent all
structural determinants. l4 The distribution of wage offers is F(w) = I’(K-f(w)).
In general, no explicit expressions exist for equilibrium solutions.
Figure 2 displays the admissible equilibrium combinations of 4 and the lowest
productivity p among active firms in the market. A value p > h can only be the
lowest p among  active firms if it equals 4.  If p0  is the low&t p among profitable
firms then all values of $ below b are feasible.15
Using numerical examples, Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000) show
that for certain structural parameter values there is a unique equilibrium, while
for others there is no equilibrium, and for yet others there are multiple equilibria.
14For  a given value of 4, and with F := 1 - I’, the equilibrium K satisfies
W = K(p) = p - (6 + x,qp))2 [(z - @)/(S + k)2 + J’ (6 + xlr(4)-2~~]  for aJl  P E (pa
15Suppose  we would assume that the reservation wage of the unemployed has a fixed given
value, and suppose we would solve the equilibrium given this value of 4. This gives outcomes
for K, F,  G etc. given 4. By substituting this G into equation (1) we obtain another value of
$, namely the value that is optimal given this G. We may do this for different starting values
of $, and the intersections of the resulting continuous curve with the diagonal (45”) line give
the equilibrium values of #. For a given equilibrium value of 4, the corresponding value of p
can be derived in Figure 2 by going from the vertical axis to the horizontal axis using the solid
curve. Note that the same procedure can be performed with Figure 1.
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Given the results in the previous subsections, it is intuitively plausible that we
may get multiple equilibria. The effect of the productivity distribution on the
reservation wage works by way of the expectation of a monotone transformation
of p,  and a discrete distribution with a finite number of points of support can be
approximated well by a continuous distribution, in terms of expectations.
Obviously, if X, = X, then there is a unique equilibrium. Bontemps, Robin,
and Van den Berg (2000) also prove that there always exists an equilibrium if
j? < 00,  provided that there is a mandatory minimum wage.‘” The type of
non-existence of equilibrium that occurs if p is discrete with a finite number of
points and X, < X,  does not carry over to the model with continuous p,  because,
basically, the distribution I’(p) is now continuous in p.  However, if jj =  00  then-
there is a different type of non-existence of equilibrium. Somewhat loosely, if 4
increases then the distribution of p among active firms may become much more
attractive, pushing up $ even more, etc.
In Appendix 2 we prove the following additional result:
If X,  > A,,  and if the continuous distribution rO  has an increasing failure rate,
and s < b, then there is a unique equilibrium.-
The failure rate (or hazard rate) of the distribution r0 is defined as y&)/&(p),
with r, = 1 - rO.  The distribution has an increasing failure rate (IFR) if the
derivative of the failure rate is nonnegative for all p f (5,  p). IFR is equivalent
to log concavity of I;,  and is implied by log concavity of T*.
Somewhat loosely, one may say that IFR implies that the right-hand tail of I’0
should be at least as thin as the tail of an exponential distribution. Examples of
IFR distributions of nonnegative random variables are exponential distributions
and normal distributions truncated from below. For other examples and a survey
of these concepts, see Van den Berg (1994). Unfortunately, IFR is an untenably
strong assumption for productivity distributions. Bontemps, Robin and Van den
Berg (2000) show that the equilibrium r0  should actually have a very fat right-
hand tail if the model is to give an accurate fit to wage data. Intuitively, this may
be plausible, as the productivity distribution dominates the wage distribution,
and there is abundant empirical evidence that wage (offer) distributions have
fatter right-hand tails than as required by IFR (see Van den Berg, 1994). In fact,
Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (2000) provide direct firm-data evidence
that the distribution of p has a fat tail and is not IFR (see Forslund and Lindh,
1997, for similar evidence). Therefore, the above uniqueness result is of limited
16The condition that there is a mandatory minimum wage is not necessary.
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usefulness.
4 Endogenous job offer arrival rates
As mentioned in the introduction, it could be argued that X, and X, may depend
on n,. This would have implications for the analysis above, since n, is smaller in
the equilibrium with only type-p, firms than in the other equilibrium. The way in
which X, and X, depend on n, follows from the matching technology on the labor
market and the search behavior of workers and firms. If n, decreases then, on
the one hand, there are less firms to be sampled by workers. On the other hand,
the remaining firms will be larger (they will have larger labor forces) so they may
well be easier to locate by searching workers. If these effects counterbalance then
X, and X, are independent of n,, and the results of the previous section follow.
In this section we adopt a more general approach. Suppose that X, and
X,  are both functions of n,, but that there is a constant ok  such that always
x, b%Jl~*(n,>  = o (below we provide a justification for such a specification in
terms of a matching function). Since we are interested in the extent to which
the previous results on multiplicity of equilibria carry through, we assume in this
section that 0 < a < 1 (so X, > x,>.  From Proposition 1, the equilibrium in
which only type-p1  firms are active exists if and only if (Y(  1 - a) (X,(qn))2(pl -
Pz>  2 (6  + Q&(474)2(P2 - b). From Proposition 2, the equilibrium in which
both types of firms are active exists if and only if o( 1 - a>(x,(n))2q2(p,  - p2) <-
(6 + G10d2(P2 - b). Thus, these two equilibria both exist if and only if
4 - 4P&?4~2  > P, - b > a(1 - a>(&(n))2q2
(s + 4k?4)2 - P, -2% (6 + ~WM2 (18)
(Note that at this stage we cannot preclude existence of more equilibria.) The
inequalities above imply the following,
Proposition 4 For any S and Q! there are values of p,, p,  and b for which both
equilibria exist, if and only if the following inequality holds,
Intuitively, it may seem that this condition is always satisfied if the match-
ing technology displays decreasing returns to scale in the number of searching
individuals, which is a fairly innocuous assumption (for example, this follows if
the matching rate displays constant returns to scale in the number of searching
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individuals and the number of vacancies taken together). However, the situation
is somewhat more complicated than this, because now the unemployment rate
also depends on rz,, and unemployed and employed searchers have different search
intensities.
To proceed, we assume that the flow of contacts between workers and em-
ployers is a function M(  .,  .)  of the “effective” measure of searching workers and
the measure of vacancies. In line with the literature, this function is called the
matching function (note that here “contact function” would be a more appropri-
ate name). First consider the second argument of M(  .,  .).  Note that all active
firms always want to expand, as the profit per additional worker is always strictly
positive. These firms always have a vacancy, and they wait passively for searching
workers. Thus, the measure of vacancies equals the measure n, of active firms.
Now let us turn to the first argument of A4(  .,  .).  All workers always search for
(better) jobs. T he “effective” measure of searching workers may differ from the
measure of searching workers m because it takes into account that some work-
ers may have different search intensities than others. We assume that workers’
search intensities are always at their physical maximum, which depends on the
worker’s labor market state but does not vary across workers. Let  a E (0,l)
denote the relative search efficiency of search by employed workers in comparison
to unemployed workers. Then the effective measure of searching workers can be
written as u + a(m - u). It follows that
un,>  = M(u + a(m - u),n,) x,(%> = M(u + cr(m - u), n,)u+a(m-u)  ’ u + cr(m - u) *cl! (20)
so that indeed a! E X,/X,.
We have to check whether the inequality (19) holds. To proceed, we assume
that A4(  .,  .)  displays constant returns to scale (CRS), which is in line with the em-
pirical literature on matching functions for the labor market (see e.g. Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1999). In particular, we adopt a CRS Cobb-Douglas specification,
M(u + a(m - u), 72,) = pa  (u + a(m - u))W2~ (21)
For ease of exposition we rule out that ,8  = 1, so that 0 < ,8  < 1. Note that-
p = 0 produces the model of the previous section.
It is useful to start assuming (incorrectly) that (20) and (21) determine how
X, changes in response to na (so that u is a fixed constant). It is straightforward
to see that X,  then increases with n,, but that the increase is sufficiently modest
for inequality (19) to hold for any 0 < 4 < 1 (this does not depend on the
Cobb-Douglas specification) l
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In reality, u also changes with 72,.  From Section 2,
uhJ 6---
m 6 + ~o(%>
(22)
By substituting (22) into (20)) using (2l),  we obtain a relation that can be written
as the inverse of the function A&z,) if p  > 0,
1
[
s
%3 = A,“$m ck + (I-  a)6+X
0 1
It can be shown that this function is increasing,17  so X, increases in n,. From
(22),  this implies that u decreases with n,. This in turn implies that X0 increases
stronger with n, than if u were a fixed constant. In words, an increase in the
number of active firms increases the job offer arrival rate of the unemployed,
which in turn decreases unemployment, and this gives a further boost to the
arrival rate of the remaining unemployed.
It remains to examine under which conditions X0 does not increase so strongly
with n, that (19) does not hold anymore. For reasons of continuity it is clear
that if u(n,>  is rather insensitive to n, (e.g. because p is small) or if A-4(.,  .)  is
rather insensitive to its second argument (e.g. because ,0  is small) then (19) still
holds. More generally, we have
Proposition 5 If the parameter p of the matching function satisfies
then for any S  and for any q E  (0,l) one can always find values of p,, p, and b
such that both equilibria exist.
The proof is in Appendix 3. The condition on ,J?  is quite weak. For moderate
values of a, the upper bound exceeds 0.75, which is larger than typical estimates
of p. In Example 1 in the previous section, o!  =  0.33, which corresponds to
p < 0.79. In fact, the above sufficient condition on ,0  is by no means necessary.
In Example I, the inequality Xo(qn)  > qAo(n)  holds for all q for values of ,0  as
high as 0.82. In general, though, if p  is much higher than (1 + fi) /2,  and is very
close to 1, then this inequality does not hold for any q. It should also be noted
17The  derivative of n, with respect to X0  is proportional to
&‘(l + z)-~  [ax2  + (1 - a)(1  - P)x  + I], with x = X0/S.  The term in square brackets is
positive for all x > 0.-
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that if Q is close to 1 then the range of values of p,,  p,  and b for which multiple
equilibria exist is very narrow.
Now let us turn to the social welfare flows. The entities S* and S** are defined
as in the previous section, the only difference being that S*  now is a function
of qn, since it depends on &(qn).  In comparison to the previous section, S* is
now lower. If the arrival rates depend on the measure of active firms then the
arrival rates in the equilibrium with only type-pi firms are lower than before.
This increases the unemployment rate, which in turn decreases social welfare. As
a result, the difference between S* and S** is now smaller than before,
The first term on the right-hand side represents the familiar productivity gain
for the type-p, equilibrium. The second term represents the loss due to increased
unemployment. Under rather extreme conditions, the sum can be negative. There
do not seem to be transparent conditions on the structural parameters under
which the sum is always positive?
Finally, we return to the examples discussed in the previous section. In these
examples, pi,  p,  and b have fixed values, so that the above proposition cannot be
applied. We can however check for which values of Xo(qn)  (or for which values of
,0)  there are multiple equilibria, by examining the inequalities (18). The values
of the job offer arrival rates given in the previous section correspond to the
equilibrium in which both types of firms are active, so the second inequality in
(18) is satisfied and this equilibrium definitely exists. For the other equilibrium
to exist, the first inequality in (18) has to hold. This inequality can be rewritten
as an inequality on Xo(qn),
Example 1 (continued). Recall that x0(n) = 0.15 and that 25% of the firms have
a high productivity. With both types of firms active, the mean social welfare
S**/n+2  equals 1156. According  to the above inequality, the equilibrium with only
high productivity firms exists if Xo(qn)  > 0.072. So, in those cases there are-
18Swinnerton  (1996) examines an equilibrium search model with wage setting, decreasing
returns to scale in production, and absence of on-the-job search. The equilibrium is unique,
but minimum wage increases may result in more rejection of applicants by firms as well as higher
production efficiency. As in our model, the net effects on welfare as well as unemployment may
be positive at the same time.
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two equilibria. Consider the equilibrium with only type-p, firms. Within the
range of admissible values of X, (qn),  the lowest social welfare and the highest
unemployment rate are attained if &(qn)  = 0.072. This gives ~/n-z  = 0.12 and
S*(qn)/m  = 1176. This social welfare is still higher than S**  despite the fact
that unemployment has almost doubled. If X,(qn)  > 0.072 then S*(qn) is even
higher; if Xo(Qn) = &(n) = 0.15 then S*(qn)/m  = 1188. The values of p that
give matching functions which generate &(qn)  > 0.072 can be determined by-
evaluating (20) and (21) at qn and n. As a result, 0 < p < 0.50.- -
Example 2 (continued). Recall that here x,(n) = 0.034 and that about 13% of
the firms have a high productivity. S**/m equals 293. The equilibrium with
only high productivity firms exists if Xo(qn)  2 0.021. If Xo(qn)  = 0.021 then the
equilibrium with only type-p, firms has u/m = 0.38 and S*(qn)/m  = 753. Thus,
social welfare is again still higher than in the other equilibrium. (IfA,  = 0.034
then S*(qn)/m  = 884.) The values of p in [0,0.22]  give matching functions which
generate X,(qn)  > 0.021.-
5 A minimum wage
In this section we focus on markets with multiple equilibria, that is, we assume
that (16) holds, which implies that X, > X,  and b < p,. Let #*  and +**  denote
the reservation wages in the equilibrium in which only type-p, firms are active
and in the other equilibrium, respectively. Now suppose that the labor market
is in the equilibrium in which both types of firms are active, and suppose that
a mandatory minimum wage wL is imposed. We assume full coverage of this
minimum wage. We can distinguish between five cases depending on the relative
value of wt.
(A). If wL < $**  then this does not have any effect on the equilibrium outcome.
(B). If 4**  < wL < p2  then the equilibrium is still such that both types of
firms are active. However, wL replaces $**  as the lowest wage in the market.
The market power of workers increases at the expense of the firms’ monopsony
power. As a result, the whole wage (offer) distribution shifts upwards. This has
a positive effect of the reservation wage #**. At first sight one may think that
the new &** may exceed wL. However, this is not possible as it would imply that
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there are two different equilibria in which both types of firms are active.lg  The
equilibrium outcomes (lo)-( 13) are still valid, provided that 4 is replaced by wL.
(C). If p, < wL < $*  then type-p, firms cannot operate profitably any-
more, and the unfavorable equilibrium is replaced by the favorable equilibrium?’
However, the outcome of the latter equilibrium is not affected in any way by wL
since it is smaller than #*  . As a result, the imposition of wL induces a shift in
the equilibrium, but the value of wL itself does not enter the new equilibrium
outcomes. The minimum wage is strictly smaller than the lowest wage in the
market, and consequently the wage (offer) density does not display a spike at it.
(0). If 4*  < wL < p, then again the unfavorable equilibrium is replaced by the-
favorable equilibrium, but now wL affects the outcome of the latter equilibrium
since it is the lowest wage in the market. The outcome in case of a homogeneous
model with w =
(1998)  .21  -
wL has been analyzed extensively in
(E). If wL > p, then both type-p, and type-p, firms-
and there will not be any production.
Van den Berg and Ridder
cannot operate profitably,
It is also interesting to examine the effect of a subsequent abolition of the
minimum wage. For this we need to be more specific about the determinants of
market entry by currently latent firms. We simply assume that, if active firms
are already present, then the entry costs faced by the latent firms are so large
that there is no entry even if the expected instantaneous profit flow of the latent
firm becomes positive due to the abolition of the minimum wage. This is of
course unlikely as a long-run outcome, but it could be regarded as a medium-run
outcome. A more sophisticated analysis would be extremely difficult, as it would
also have to deal with out-of-equilibrium dynamics.
lgThe expression for 4** in case @** < wL < pz is  as  fdlows,
ti
** (6 + X1)2b  + (x0  - X1)6WL  + (X0  - b)h(CPl  + (I-  c)P2)-
(6 + Xl)@  + X0)
with c as in (14). The expression on the right-hand side is smaller than WL iff the expression
on the right-hand side of (14) is smaller than wt.
201n  practice, the minimum wage level may not be determined by maximization of social
welfare. Sobel (1999) convincingly argues that the relative strength of interest groups in the
political process is an important determinant.
21The  expression for 4’  in case $* < WL < pl is as follows,-
ti
* (6 + W2b  + (X0  - b)h2  + (X0  - q&1)1-
(6 + h)(S  + Ao)
The expression on the right-hand side is smaller than WL iff the expression on the right-hand
side of (8) is smaller than WL.
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If wL is abolished in (A), then nothing changes. In (B), (0) and (E), the
equilibrium outcomes do change. In (B) and (D), the set of active firms does not
change, but the wage distribution shifts towards lower wages. The equilibrium
in (I?) returns to the equilibrium with outcomes that are equal to those before
imposition of wL. In (C’,  the equilibrium outcome does not change, meaning
that the temporary imposition of wL has established a permanent shift from the
unfavorable to the favorable equilibrium.
Let us return to the effects of the imposition of wL.  Obviously, the most
interesting cases above are (C) and (D), because then the minimum wage induces
a shift to the more favorable equilibrium. Case (C’ is the most intriguing. From
the fact that the minimum wage is strictly smaller than the lowest wage in the
market, a casual observer may induce that the minimum wage is not “binding”
and is thus irrelevant. Indeed, he may be strengthened in this belief in case of
an abolition of the minimum wage, since the latter does not affect equilibrium.
It is important to stress that these results are not due to the assumption that
p can only attain two values. Recall from Subsection 3.4 that multiple equilibria
are possible if p has a continuous distribution or a discrete distribution with
more than two points of support. In the model with a continuously distributed
p, the imposition of a minimum wage in between the two reservation wages that
are associated with the two equilibria ensures that one of the equilibria cannot
exist anymore, but it does not affect the outcome of the other equilibrium. This
corresponds to case (C) above.
The minimum wage effects are consistent with a number of stylized facts
(see Card and Krueger, 1995). First, in general, an increase in the minimum
wage decreases wage variation. Secondly, an increase in the minimum wage does
not have a large effect on employment. In the model versions of Section 3,
the employment effect is zero as long as the minimum wage does not cross the
highest p in the market. In the model of Section 4 the employment effect is zero
as long as the minimum wage does not cross p,. If it does, then the magnitude of
the negative employment effect depends on the shape of the matching function.
Thirdly, an increase in the minimum wage has a positive effect on wages above
1t.
It is often argued that a spike in the wage density at the minimum wage
indicates that the minimum wage has an effect on the wage density, whereas the
absence of such a spike indicates that the minimum wage is irrelevant. Clearly,
the results above question the universal validity of such a view. It should be
stressed that our model does not preclude the presence of a spike at wL.  In case
(B) above, the wage (offer) density displays a spike at wL if the latter is only
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marginally lower than p,  . In the latter case, all type-p, firms are active, and they
are all forced to pay a wage in between wL and p,.  A likewise situation occurs
in case (0) above, if wt  is only marginally lower than pi.  Bontemps, Robin and
Van den Berg (2000) show that such a “congestion” spike in the wage density at
wL can also be generated if p is continuously distributed. Interestingly, wage data
from European countries often do not display a spike at the minimum wage even
though there is typically full compliance (see evidence in &tros, 1994, Koning,
Ridder and Van den Berg, 1995, Van den Berg and Ridder, 1998, Bunzel et al.,
1999, and Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg, 2000).
Now let us turn to some practical issues that come up if one would use the
above insights for policy. First of all, in reality, different individuals have dif-
ferent individual-specific productivity components. The model framework does
not allow for dispersion of such components within a labor market. Therefore,
the results seem to be more relevant for labor markets with a homogeneous kind
of work, where individual-specific productivity differences are relatively small.
Secondly, recall that firms are assumed to set wages rather than bargain over
wages with workers. The theoretical studies by Manning (1993) and Ellingsen
and Rosen (1997) examine under which conditions a firm is more likely to set
wages rather than bargain over them. Both conclude that wage setting is more
relevant for jobs that require less skills. Thirdly, a minimum wage is obviously a
more relevant policy instrument for labor markets with relatively low productiv-
ity levels. In sum, the results in the present paper seem to be particularly relevant
for labor market segments at the bottom of the economy, with jobs that do not
require high skills.
Suppose that the labor market consists of a number of separate labor markets
called segments. Each segment is a separate labor market of its own, and workers
in a particular segment are homogeneous. Within a segment, labor productivity
may be dispersed among the firms that are active in the segment. In each seg-
ment, the equilibrium then is as in our model. However, segments may differ in
terms of their individual-specific productivity, so the distribution of p may vary
across segments. In that case, the imposition of a minimum wage that exceeds the
highest possible productivity level within a particular segment causes all firms
in that segment to become unprofitable. All individuals associated with that
segment then become permanently (or structurally) unemployed. Let the distri-
bution of pi among the population of individuals be denoted by H. (For example,
if there are two segments, one with 7570  of all individuals and with pi = 1200
and one with 25!%  of all individuals and with pi = 1500 then H(z) = 0.75 for
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II: E [1200,1500).)  Then the unemployment rate is equal to
u--
m
- &(I-  H(wd + H(wd
0
The first and second term on the right-hand side reflect frictional unemployment
and structural unemployment, respectively. Here, we assume that a single value
of wL holds for all segments.22 In the current setup it is however optimal to have
a different minimum wage for each segment. This of course requires knowledge
of the highest productivity value in each segment. In many European countries,
trade unions and employer federations meet every year to negotiate the minimum
wage for different segments (i.e. different occupations within different sectors) of
the labor market. Such negotiated segment-specific minimum wages are often
subsequently legally imposed by the government. The analysis in this section
provides a justification of this practice.
6 Heterogeneous unemployed workers
So far we have assumed that workers are homogeneous, and, in particular, that
the opportunity value of employment b is a fixed constant. This assumption
is violated if some workers enjoy leisure more than others, of if unemployment
benefits are dispersed. In this section we show that the main results above are
robust with respect to this. We analyze an equilibrium search model in which
workers on the same labor market can have different individual-specific b and
firms can have different production technologies. For expositional reasons we
now abstract from search on the job. Furthermore, we simply assume that the
b can attain two possible values (b,  and b,,  with probabilities x and 1 - K)),
and (again) that p can attain two possible values (pf  and p, with probabilities
q and I -  q).  The relevant theoretical literature includes MacMinn  (1980) and
Albrecht and Axe11 (1984), who actually assume a continuous distribution of p
across firms. The Albrecht and Axe11  (1984) model is estimated by Eckstein and
Wolpin (1990). Mortensen (1990) derives a number of properties of equilibria in
a model with discrete b and p.
If unemployed workers have different b then in general they also have different
reservation wages. The most important equilibrium property is that the support
of the equilibrium wage offer distribution is a subset of (or coincides with) the
set of unemployed workers’ reservation wages. Basically, any other offer value
221f  H is continuous, and WL is in its support, then typically the value of the population wage
density at WE  is positive.
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can be improved upon by offering the reservation wage below the offer: this gives
a higher profit per worker without any loss in the size of the labor force of the
firm. Another equilibrium property is that higher-productivity firms offer higher
wages and are therefore able to attract more workers.
We assume that b,  < p,  < b, < pi. Note from equation (1) that a worker’s
reservation wage $i is now always larger than or equal to his benefits level b; (take
x 1 = 0; they are equal iff bi =  w>.  Equilibrium is either such that & < p,,  or
such that CJ&  2  p,. In the first case, all firms are active. Type-p2  firms offer &,
and type-p, firms may offer c#&  and/or &,,  depending on the parameter values. In
the second case, only type-p, firms are active, and they may offer & and/or &.
In Appendix 4 we prove the following result.
Proposition 6 In the model with heterogeneity of workers’ unemployment bene-
fits, assume that
There exist exactly two equilibria if and only if
s b sl-P,>-
x,4 > P, - b, - A,
In one equilibrium, only type-p, firms are active. In the other, both types are
active. If (25) is not satisfied then there exists exactly one equilibrium.
(Note that p, and r do not affect (25)) whereas p, does not affect (24))  so that
(24) cannot be in conflict with (25) .)
The mechanism behind the multiplicity of equilibrium is essentially the same
as in Section 3. In one of the equilibria, both high-productivity and low-productivity
firms are active. In that equilibrium, the former firms offer b, and the latter firms
offer #2,  which in turn has a rather low value. In the other equilibrium, only high-
productivity firms are active, and they offer b,. The unemployed workers with
a low benefits level then have a rather high reservation wage $2.  Indeed, in
this second equilibrium, $2  > p,, so +2  acts as a binding lower bound on the
set of production technologies that enable a positive profit per worker. It rules
out production at the low productivity level. The resulting wages are higher
than in the first equilibrium. This in turn justifies the higher reservation wage
in the second equilibrium. Thus, like in Section 3, the reservation wage of the
unemployed affects the set of profitable production technologies, while the set
of production technologies in use in turn affects the reservation wage, and this
system has multiple solutions.
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Analogous to Section 4, one may argue that X, may depend on the measure
of active firms n,. However, it is easy to see from (25) that, like in Section 4,
the condition (19) on X,(qn)  is necessary and sufficient for both equilibria to be
possible. Specifically, if (24) is satisfied then there are values of p2,  b, and b, for
which both equilibria exist, if and only if X,(qn) > q&(n).
The analysis of minimum wage effects is also essentially the same as before.
That is, one may single out the equilibrium with only type-p, firms by imposing
a minimum wage wL satisfying p, < wL  5 p,. If this wL is smaller than b, then it
is strictly smaller than the new lowest wage in the market. In comparison to the
previous sections, the model with heterogeneous b provides an additional reason
for social welfare to be higher in case of the equilibrium with only type-p, firms
(i.e. in case of a minimum wage exceeding p2).  This reason is nothing but the
traditional argument for a minimum wage in monopsonistic labor markets: it
increases employment (see Albrecht and Axell, 1984, and Eckstein and Wolpin,
1990). In the equilibrium in which both types of firms are active, type-b, indi-
viduals reject job offers from type-p, firms. However, in the other equilibrium,
all job offers are always accepted, so unemployment is lower.
Note that imposition of a relatively high minimum wage, as a means to single
out the desirable equilibrium, should be preferred over an over-all increase of
unemployment benefits with an amount A > p2  - b,.- The latter policy also
ensures that type-p, firms are not active; however, the new benefits level b, + A
of the type-b, individuals may be larger than p,, in which case these individuals
will become permanently unemployed.
In The Netherlands, as in many other countries, the level of social assistance
benefits for unemployed workers is mostly determined by household composition
(see Van den Berg, Van der Klaauw and Van Ours, 1998, for details; unemployed
workers may be entitled to such benefits if their unemployment insurance enti-
tlement has expired). The model in this section has some relevance for the labor
market of such workers. Imposition of a minimum wage just below the highest
possible social assistance level has the advantages that (1) the equilibrium is such
that workers only work at higher-productivity firms and (2) frictional unemploy-
ment is reduced.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the mutual dependence of the reservation wage
of the unemployed and the minimum productivity level at which production is
profitable. Specifically, we showed that this dependence can generate multipli-
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city of equilibrium. Using results from the literature on structural estimation of
equilibrium search models, we showed that multiplicity is an empirically relevant
phenomenon. These results remain valid under a number of model extensions.
In particular, we accounted for the fact that the workers’ job offer arrival rates
depend on the number of productive firms. In addition, we examined a model
in which unemployed workers differ in terms of their unemployment benefits or
value of leisure. In that case, the lowest reservation wage among the unemployed
interacts with the lowest profitable productivity level.
These results imply that a minimum wage policy can be fruitfully applied to
single out the desirable equilibrium. In such a case, the resulting minimum wage
may wrongfully appear to be irrelevant, as its value can be strictly smaller than
the lowest wage in the market. The results provide a justification of a policy in
which minimum wages are sector-specific and occupation-specific.
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Appendix
Appendix 1. Three firm types.
There is an equilibrium in which only type-p, firms are active if and only if
( x , - x , ) x ,  >  P2  -  b
(6 + x,j2 - P l  - P2
This is of course equivalent to Proposition 1.
There is an equilibrium in which type-p, and type-p, firms are active but
type-p, firms are not active if and only if
p2  - b > (x0  - x,)x, 4P,  - b)
Pl  -  P2 (6 + x,)2  c
 L c(P,  - P2) + (P2  - PJ
(26)
with
with cl- q1-
Ql  + 42
Note that 0 < c < 1. The first inequality in (26) is of course equivalent to
Proposition 2.
Finally, there is an equilibrium in which all three firm types are active if and
only if
(x0 - Wl < P3 - b
(6  + u2 CAP,  - P2>  + C2(P2 - P3)
with
so that 0 < ci < ~2  < 1.
It cannot be ruled out a priori that there are multiple equilibria. Let, for a
given equilibrium, the numbers in a set { . ..} indicate which firm types are active.
It is possible that for given parameter values there exist { 1,2,3},  { 1,2}, and { 1)
equilibria. It is also possible that for given parameter values there exist { 1,2,3}
and { 1) equilibria but no { 1,2} equilibrium. It is also possible that for given
parameter values there exist { 1,2} and { 1) equilibria but no { 1,2,3}  equilib-
rium.
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Appendix 2. Uniqueness in case of IFR distributions.
If X, > Xi and s < b then, by equation (1), any equilibrium solution for #-
satisfies $ 2 p_,,  which implies that any equilibrium solution for p satisfies p = 4.
By substituting F(w) = K(p) into equation (1), using the expression for K(p) in
footnote 14, and using the relation between I? and rO,  and imposing that p = 4,
we obtain,
To (P> 1
2
6T (+> + x F (p> d p
0 1 0
Any equilibrium is characterized by a solution of this equation for 4.  Consider
the left-hand and right-hand sides as functions of $ on (b,p).  At b, the left-hand
side is smaller than the right-hand side. The left-hand side is strictly increasing
everywhere. The right-hand side is not decreasing everywhere for every possible
ro. To proceed, consider the derivative of the right-hand side with respect to @
This equals
with
2x,s2x
s’(x) = (6 + x,2)3
We apply partial integration to (28),  going from -s’(?;,(p)/~o(~))y,(p)/~o(~)  to
its integral s(~,(p)/~,(@). The function s(x) equals
X$X 2
s(x)  = (S  + A1x)2’
In the process, we exploit the fact that the IFR property implies that ~~(p)/T~(p)
is strictly larger than 0 for all p close to p.  After much rewriting, it follows that
(28) equals
If r. is IFR then the derivative ofro(p)/yo(p) is negative for all p < Jo.  Therefore,
(28) is negative for all 4 E (b, j?). This implies that the right-hand side of (27)
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is decreasing everywhere. As a result, there is at most one solution to (27). If
p < 00  then we already know from Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (2000)
that there exists an equilibrium, so then the equilibrium is unique. Ifp = oo then
it follows directly from (27) that there is always a value of 4 at which both sides
intersect, so then the equilibrium is unique as well. Cl
Appendix 3. Proof of Proposition 5.
The condition (19) holds for all 0 < q < 1 iff the inverse function n,(&)  satisfies
for all 0 < X, < A,(n),  where X, is the argument of the function n,(  .),  and n and
x0(n)  are fixed constants. We first consider the case p > 0. Equation (23) can
be rewritten as
% x0- -
-( )
$ cy+(l-a)&
n xob-4 a+(l-  604 6+X0(n)
Therefore, n,/n < Xo/Ao(n) iff
l  1 l  1
$$(6 + &X0) < ~$~~-) (6 + do(n))
0 On
(29)
We already know that Ao(n,)  < X0(n),  so if the function ~B-~(S+crz)/(6+z)
strictly increases in II:  for 1x3 E (0, x0(n)],  then the inequality (29) is true for all
x0 f (0, ~0b-a ( i.e. for all q E (0,l)). The derivative of this function with respect
to IX: is proportional to
cu(  1 - /0)x”  + S(1  + a - 2P)a:  + S2(  1 - p> (30)
Clearly, the values of this expression are positive for every (x: >  0 if the second-
coefficient S(1 + a - 2p) is non-negative. This gives the sufficient condition
0 < /?  <  (1 + a> /2. Expression (30) is a second-degree polynomial in z. After
some elaboration it follows that its values are positive on R iff (1 - &)/2  <
P < (1  + m/2, and its values are positive on IR except at one point iff
p = (1 - &)/2  or ,8  =  (1 + &)/2.  This gives the second sufficient condi-
tion: (1 -  &)/2  5 p 5 (1 + &)/2. Together, the two conditions result in
0 < p < (1 + &)/2.  In fact, the latter gives a complete characterization of the-
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parameter values for which (30) is positive for all J: > 0 except possibly for one-
II:  value, given that 0 < ~11,  ,0  < 1. Finally, if p  = 0 the X, does not depend on n,,
so ( 19) is trivially satisfied for every 0 < q < 1. 0
Appendix 4. Proof of Proposition 6.
A fraction x (a fraction 1 - X)  of the workers has b =  b, (b = b2)  and a fraction
q (a fraction 1 - q) of the possible firms has p = p, (p = p2).  The only possible
wage offers are & and &. The set of possible wage offer distributions F(W) can
be summarized by P+(zu = @,>  = y = 1 - PrF(W  = &)  with 0 5 y 5 1. The
parameters & & and y remain to be determined. From equation (1) it follows
that & = b, and that
Now let us examine the steady-state labor forces of firms paying @r  and of
firms paying $2. Analogous to the derivation of equation (2),  we find that the
fraction TG  of employed workers earning $!Q  equals
TG  =
s + $4, + +)(l - 7)
y’  s+yx, - n-q 1 - 7)
which is one minus the fraction earning $2.  Here we use the fact that a worker is
indifferent between earning +2  at a type-p, firm and earning $2  at a type-p1  firm.
Note that TG  > y, indicating that type-p1  firms will be larger than type-p, firms.
A type-p, firm, if active, always offers 41~ (recall that p, < b,). This means
that the equilibrium value of y must satisfy y < q. Now consider a type-p1
firm. If it offers b, then the profit flow equals (PI -  bl)yG(m  - u)/~,  whereas if
it offers & then this flow equals (pr  -  42)(1 - YG)(m - u)/(l - 7). A solution
for 7 E (074) means that type-p, are indifferent between offering either of these
wages. The profit flows then must be equal. After some tedious calculations this
can be shown to imply that
e + UP, - b,) = (6 + do)(bl - b2) (31)
Perhaps surprisingly, this does not depend on y at all. Thus, in the pathological
case in which this equality is satisfied, every value of y in [0, q]  admits an equilib-
rium. Consequently, we then have an infinite number of equilibria (this peculiar
result is however not robust with respect to the inclusion of a discount rate in
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the individuals’ optimization problem; see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998). If
the left-hand side of (31) is smaller than the right-hand side, then offering $2
is always more profitable than offering b,. Consequently, the equilibrium value
of y is zero, and & is driven down to b,. Note that this is true regardless of
the value of q, that is, regardless of whether there are any active type-p, firms
Consequently, if the left-hand side of (31) is smaller than the right-hand side,
then the unique equilibrium is that all wages equal b,. All firms are then active,
but all individuals with b = b, are permanently unemployed.
Now suppose that the left-hand side of (31)  exceeds the right-hand side. We
start assuming that firms of both types are active in equilibrium. This must be
verified, by checking whether in equilibrium & < p,.  Now, b, is always the most
profitable wage offer for type-p, firms. Consequently, the equilibrium y equals
q, ad & equals  (Sb, + X,qb,)/(S + &q). I n sum, all type-p, firms offer b, and
all type-p, firms offer this value of &. There holds that &,  < p, iff the first
inequality of (25) holds.
Now again suppose that the left-hand side of (31)  exceeds the right-hand side,
but now assume that only type-p, firms are active in equilibrium. This must be
verified, by checking whether in equilibrium & > p,.  Again, b, is always the most
profitable wage offer for type-p1  firms. Consequently, the equilibrium y equals
1, and & equals (Sb,  + X,b,)/(S  + A,). T here holds that & > p, iff the second-
inequality of (25) holds. This proves the proposition. •I
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